Chimpanzee social intelligence: selfishness, altruism, and the mother–infant bond

Primates (2009) 50:3–11
DOI 10.1007/s10329-008-0122-1
REVIEW ARTICLE
Special contributions to commemorate the 60th
anniversary of Japanese primatology


Satoshi Hirata
Received: 8 July 2008/ Accepted: 2 December 2008 /Published online: 10 January 2009
Ó Japan Monkey Centre and Springer 2009


Abstract
To better understand the human mind from an
evolutionary perspective, a great deal of research has
focused on the closest living relative of humans, the
chimpanzee, using various approaches, including studies of
social intelligence. Here, I review recent research related to
several aspects of social intelligence, including deception,
understanding of perception and intention, social learning,
trading, cooperation, and regard for others. Many studies
have demonstrated that chimpanzees are pro cient in using
their social intelligence for sel sh motives to bene t from
their interactions with others. In contrast, it is not yet
clear whether chimpanzees engage in prosocial behaviors
that bene t others; however, chimpanzee mother–in fant
interactions indicate the possibility of such behaviors.
Therefore, I propose that chimpanzees possess rudimentary
traits of human mental competence not only in terms of
theory of mind in a broader sense but also in terms of
prosociality involving regard for others. Mother–infant
interactions appear to be particularly important to under-
standing the manifestation of social intelligence from an
evolutionary perspective.

Introduction
Three decades have passed since Premack and Woodruff
(1978) coined the phrase ‘‘theory of mind.’’ Developmental
psychological studies of human children have since used
this paradigm to document how children understand each
other’s minds in terms of beliefs, desires, and knowledge
(e.g., Wimmer and Perner 1983; Baron-Cohen et al. 1985).
This new paradigm also created a basis for the comparative
study of social cognition in nonhuman primates from an
evolutionary perspective. After the concept of ‘‘Machia-
vellian intelligence’’ was introduced (Byrne and Whiten
1988), researchers began to increasingly discuss its relation
to primates, in terms of the theory of mind and other types
of social cognition (e.g., Whiten and Byrne 1997).
Call and Tomasello (2008) summarized recent advances
in the study of chimpanzees’ understanding of the minds of
other individuals. They concluded that chimpanzees
understand others in terms of a perception–goal psychology
but not in terms of full- edged, human-like belief–desire
psychology. In other words, chimpanzees have a theory of
mind in a broad sense, yet they do not possess a more
narrowly de ned theory of mind that requires understand-
ing of false beliefs. Therefore, although chimpanzees lack
certain human traits, humans do not possess an entirely
unique social intelligence; rather, some rudimentary traits
exist in chimp anzees (Call and Tomasello 2008).